Date: January 25th 2023

Time: 2PM-4PM

Location:

LIP6, Sorbonne University (Pierre and Marie Curie Campus) - 4 place Jussieu (metro Jussieu), tower 26, first flour, hall 25-26, room 105.

The room can be accessed either via tower 26 or via tower 25. (Find a map here.)

First Presentation:

Olga Gorelkina

(University of Liverpool Management School)

Olga Gorelkina

A Mechanism Design Model for Blockchain Governance

Abstract:

This paper offers a model of blockchain governance based on a virtually efficient mechanism. Agents’ preference reports and betting on the reports made in the future determine the welfare maximizing allocation. To induce truth telling, the mechanism implements two part transfers with a VCG component and a betting reward that depends on how accurately the prior updated upon the agent’s report predicts reports observed in the next period. The mechanism satisfies participation constraints and generates no deficit after any reported history.


Second Presentation:

Fayçal Drissi

(University of Oxford and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Fayçal Drissi

Decentralised Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision

Abstract:

We introduce a new comprehensive metric of predictable loss (PL) for liquidity providers in constant function automated market makers and derive an optimal liquidity provision strategy. PL compares the value of the LP’s holdings in the liquidity pool (assuming no fee revenue) with that of a self-financing portfolio that replicates the LP’s holdings and invests in a risk-free account. We provide closed-form formulae for PL, and show that the losses stem from two sources: the convexity cost, which depends on liquidity taking activity and the convexity of the pool’s trading function; the opportunity cost, which is due to locking the LP’s assets in the pool. For LPs in constant product market makers with concentrated liquidity, we derive a closed-form strategy that dynamically adjusts the range around the exchange rate as a function of market trend, volatility, and liquidity taking activity in the pool. We prove that the profitability of liquidity provision depends on the tradeoff between PL and fee income. Finally, we use Uniswap v3 data to show that LPs have traded at a significant loss, and to show that the out-of-sample performance of our strategy is considerably superior to the historical performance of LPs in the pool we consider.